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Cognitive linguistics and conversation analysis (a) converge in the analysis of category
bound activities and (b) in viewing thinking and talking as embodied activities. The
first aim of this paper is to outline these powerful theories as useful tools for the
analysis of enacting empathy. The second aim is to outline these theories as useful tools
for the analysis of how empathy is co-enacted in clinical conversation documented in
transcripts. Cognitive Linguistics and Conversation Analysis converge in detecting patterns
of I-You-relationships with roots in early preverbal embodied protoconversation continuing
to more symbolic conversational level. The paper proposes to describe this continuity
of empathic conversation in musical metaphors like balance, rhythm and resonance. In
a first section transcripts from therapeutic sessions are presented. In a second section
linguistic and other research data are presented in order to bring empirical data to this new
conception of how empathy can be understood, how it is done and how two participants
cooperate to enact empathy. Ideas for further research are outlined.
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INTRODUCTION
All therapists with a clinical background share some of the fol-
lowing experiences: talking to a depressive patient you suddenly
realize how your voice changes. You speak in a calm and soothing
manner, you turn your voice down to a gentle mode. It is not that
your voice changes into this depressive-response mode gradually.
It is there right from the start. You see your patient for the first
time, you see her or his eyes and you “know” how to respond. But
this is not (static) “knowledge” you have from a handbook, it can-
not be written down in teachable and learnable sentences. It just
happens, it is a process of “knowing,” less from “knowledge.” You
adopt yourself to something you sense and often it takes a long
time to realize that you did.
The phenomenon is far-reaching. Being married to another
therapist, I have very often witnessed the fact that by listening
to one’s partner responding to the client’s first phone call, the
bystanding partner can make a kind of diagnostic proposal just
from listening to the voice of the partner answering the phone.
More often than not this diagnostic assessment turns out to be
correct. Therapists have a different way of talking with anxious
clients from that with obsessive compulsive ones, they change
pitch, volume and speech rhythm when they talk to a client with
a personality disorder in a different manner to when engaging
with someone who is depressive. Very often this adaptation in
resonance remains beyond conscious awareness.
Galatzer-Levy (2009) reports another experience. He had a
patient who never responded after his therapist had said some-
thing. He simply was silent for half a minute or so and when
speaking he would change topic. So the therapist was never
informed via a feed-back loop whether he had said something
correct or not, nor whether he had even been heard! Sometimes
the therapist even got to feeling uncertain whether he had actually
spoken or not. After having endured this derealiziationmode for a
certain time he made up his mind to address the pattern directly.
And what did the patient say? “I admit and go on.” Perplexed,
the therapist responded with something like “You admit and go
on” and quickly the patient now answered “Yes, I admit and go
on.” This little exchange of the same phrase had a rhythm, spoken
with groove and swing—both suddenly felt compelled to laugh.
So in a difficult dialog format suddenly a sort of warm cheerful-
ness emerged, bringing this therapy into a new mode. Not the
meaning of the words, it was the bodily dance-like rhythm that
moved the therapeutic pair to a new level.
Elizabeth Nutt Williams (2008, p. 140) reports that one
evening she wanted to review a video-taped session that she
remembered as vivid, full of quick verbal exchange. “I was
stunned to see a low-key, slow, and fairly quiet one instead. I
was struck by the vast difference between my experience and the
recorded tape.” How can this imbalance be accounted for?
When in June 2013 at a research-conference at “International
Psychoanalytic University” (IPU) in Berlin, Germany, I presented
a CA (Schegloff, 2007a,b) of a psychoanalytic first interview
exchange I discovered a rhythmic element in it. The experienced
therapist gave an impulse by asking a confrontational question—
and when the patient answered the therapist did not come up
with the next question, but withdrew with a conversational con-
tinuer like “hm:h” which pragmatically means something like
“go ahead.” So on the transcript one could see a certain kind
of rhythm: one hard beat (the impulse of a question) followed
by 3–4 soft beats like “hm:h,” calmly spoken. This way of begin-
ning an initiative left room for the patient’s own initiatives. One
could not say that this pattern was planned, it emerged from
the situation. It was a kind of musical rhythm that made the
burden of being interviewed a little lighter. It was one of those
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impressive interviews, wherein a skilled therapist manages to
talk with a patient never seen before about deep involvement in
certain sexual topics without being either intrusive or seductive.
This kind of experience can best be described by musical
metaphors like resonance, rhythm or balance. Since Freud it is
well known that psychic experience cannot be conceptualized
but in metaphors. But is it necessary to hold on to metaphors
of “inner” mental (or cognitive) life and “outer” real world as
so many contemporary theorists like to do? Potter and Edwards
(2013) analyze the consequences of such a distinction. These
metaphors guide many quarrels about “cognition” vs. “social
cause” of traumatic experience, they stem from a Cartesian tra-
dition of separating body from mind. Using new metaphors as
guide may contribute to get a deeper understanding of embod-
ied simulation, of conversation and of helpful interactions. This
gradually growing conviction inspired me to look for the musi-
cal structure of talk-in-interaction (Malloch and Trevarthen, 2010
were inspiring reading), especially psychotherapy, and to explore
if there are some deeper layers contributing to empathy and
the experience of being understood which is so elementary in
psychotherapy.
My proposal is to combine CA and a special part of embod-
iment theory taken from CL (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987).
Lakoff’s subtitle (1987) was “What categories reveal about the
mind.” Huge parts of this influential book refer to cognitive the-
ory and experimental psychology, especially to prototype theory
of Eleanor Rosch (Rosch and Lloyd, 1978) and her followers
(Varela et al., 1993). In CLmetaphors are no longer viewed as part
of “texts” but as part of cognitive operations. They organize one’s
understanding of the world and of oneself-being-in-the-world.
Metaphors have the potential to generate surprising kinds of
category type and content (Glucksberg, 2008). In preverbal chil-
dren’s play the creation of metaphors can be detected (Tomasello,
2008). Metaphors become an element of thinking and not only of
speaking.
In CA there is a deep interest in categorizing. CA is not only
about “turn-taking,” repair activities etc., but also about “doing
categorizing” (Sacks, 1980; Lepper, 2000; Schegloff, 2007a,b).
However, interestingly enough, there is no mentioning neither
of “categorizing” nor “metaphor” in the topic index of “The
handbook of conversation analysis” (Sidnell and Stivers, 2013).
However, both influential traditions, CA and CL, deal with
categorizing activity as part of human cognition and conversa-
tion. Embodiment is a useful thread to combine both with the
aim to come closer to a solution of the riddle how cognition
is influenced by conversation. This means (a) to better under-
stand what “understanding” means in clinical practice, (b) how
it is done, (c) how empathy is co-organized by two embod-
ied participants. Empathy is a practice of “doing empathy,” not
a magical or mystical equipment, it is no one-way endeavor.
However, both participants indispensably use categories and they
use conversation in order to match the difference. The musical
dimension operates in leveling differences bearable. Sometimes,
there is “groove” in good therapy sessions. However, this should
not lead one to overlook many musical dimensions of conversa-
tionally “doing empathy.” Empathy can be studied as embodied
practice in clinical contexts.
In CL it is assumed that all categories used to organize one’s
experience can be derived from bodily sensory experience. Thus,
the Cartesian assumption of a mind in the body can be reverted to
that there is a body in the mind (Johnson, 1987). For example, the
prelanguage bodily experience of “balance” can be shown to apply
to mathematical equations (Lakoff and Nunez, 2000; Nunez,
2008, 2011) and high levels of abstract mathematical thinking.
Combining CA and CLmight 1 day arrive at a subtle understand-
ing how (therapeutic) conversation can influence the cognitive
“apparatus” of clients enmeshed in seemingly unresolvable dif-
ficulties. In a CA+CL-approach categories care for “order at
every point” as talk-in-interaction does. The ambivalent question
(Heritage, 1984) like “Why don’t you come and see me some-
times?” can be heard as friendly invitation or as reproach. The
answer will inform the questioner about how the second speaker
categorized. The change of category is an important aspect of
therapeutic change—often achieved by therapist’s using reformu-
lations (Antaki, 2008). The client metaphorically speaks about
somebody about whom he “exploded like a volcano,” the ther-
apist may ask: “What made you so indignant?”—Using another
metaphor with the effect that the emotional event appears in a
new frame. These examples may suffice here. Categories operate
in a multidimensional way. One cannot do without. How can this
approach be applied in the analysis of clinical conversations?
It was Harvey Sacks (1992, p. 117) who reminded us that to
understand another person you must use the distinction between
“observables” and “communication.” First, you look at another’s
bodily clothing and behavior, gesture, mimic display in her face,
you are struck by a gaze and listen to her voice. Then, you con-
clude something from these observables, you categorize these
observations as indices of social status, gender, race etc. and of
an internal state like (generally) intentionality or joy, pleasure,
shame or the like. Third, you begin to speak following the rules
of a (local) culture. Fourth, while observing and categorizing you
realize that the same happens to you. Fifth, a cycle of mutual
observing and reasoning is created within a few moments and
within this cycle, sixth, the therapeutic task is to generate con-
versational contributions smoothly urging the other person to
“doing opening,” which means to give that kind of knowledge
that makes a common production of “empathy” possible. In any
case, there are embodied persons mutually observing, categoriz-
ing, producing utterances by bodily voices for bodily ears. (Cf.
Reich, 2010). Doing conversation by embodied persons solves the
old philosophical problem of how people often “do understand
each other” although they cannot look into another’s mind.
The CA+CL-approach has been theoretically detailed and
empirically validated by an extended qualitative study of a 4-year
group therapy with sexual offenders in prison (Buchholz et al.,
2008; Mörtl et al., 2010). We studied a huge corpus of tran-
scribed group therapy sessions. The CA+CL-approach proved
useful to gain a better understanding of how these people talk.
While overtly confessing what they had done they secretly allude
with certain indices to arouse listeners in the group, they use and
share askew metaphors and they skillfully exploit a therapist’s
authenticity to blind his understanding. Their cognitive apparatus
uses a high level of empathy in a very instrumental way. It seemed
useful to combine CA and CL in order to make these phenomena
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hearable and visible for our analyses. And in order to understand
how two very skillful therapists managed to overcome these dif-
ficulties and to bring these men in a deeper examination of what
they did which brought some of them into a serious suicidal crisis.
If this crisis was passed we could observe that they had changed
the use of metaphors, their way of talking and categorizing things.
This paper starts with CA and its utility for the analy-
sis of studying empathy as embodied practice in psychother-
apy. Embodiment concepts of CL and CA will be integrated.
Transcribed examples will be analyzed. The second part reviews
some findings from infant research, psychotherapy process
research and conversation analysis in order to mine neighboring
fields in the expectation to find some treasures for embodiment
theory, gaining new kinds of data or methodological progress.
This might contribute to gaining a clearer, empirically-based
definition of what we mean by empathy—two embodied per-
sons engaged in producing mutual understanding. The paper
concludes with some ideas about further research.
A COMBINATION OF CONVERSATION ANALYSIS AND
COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: USEFUL IN STUDYING EMPATHY
AS EMBODIED PRACTICE
The therapeutic relationship is seen as the most influential factor
in psychotherapy. Several dimensions have been differentiated.
Since Freud’s distinction between a “decent” and “transferential”
relationship dimension, most modern researchers and clinical
therapists see the importance of a “working alliance” (WA).
Several instruments have been developed to measure the degree
of working alliance since Bordin (1979) inaugurated a tripolar
theory differentiating a working alliance into “aims,” “tasks,” and
the entire “bond.” This conception integrates the (disembodied)
rational means-end-orientation (MEO) of psychotherapy with
the emotional side of the relationship (ESR). Ruptures of working
alliances typically show up in the MEO—patients do not comply
with arrangements, dates, appear too late to a session or forget
what they had agreed to—but most often have their origins in the
ESR: a sensitive domain of their experience has been addressed
in too rough a fashion, they feel criticized by the therapist or
devalued. The contributions of the therapist to alliance ruptures
cannot be ignored either, e.g., the therapist might try too inten-
sively to explore negative feelings or was not “licensed” to do so.
Colli and Lingiardi (2009, p. 721) propose to differentiate thera-
pist’s failure into relational (empathy, attunement, warmth) and
technical (type or focus of intervention) failure. Thus, as Safran
and Muran (2000, p. 165) have pointed out, alliance is not a static
variable based on mutual agreement only (MEO), but emerges
from resonances in ESR. Scales have been constructed to measure
the collaborative interaction of theWA (Colli and Lingiardi, 2009)
or how the alliance is (re-)negotiated after ruptures (Doran et al.,
2012).
The details of verbal exchange are so meaningful that seri-
ous doubts arose whether therapeutic talk can be analyzed by
pre-established codings (Stiles, 1988, 1995; Stiles and Shapiro,
1989). However, CA is a micro-analytic method with a fine-
grained methodological view for saving elusive data against a
too strong theory. CA has its origins in Ethnomethodology and
social linguistics and since has proved an enormous potential
to discover new phenomena (Martinez et al., 2012). It can be
combined with similar approaches like analysis of metaphor
(Buchholz, 1996/2003; Cameron and Maslen, 2010). CL (Lakoff,
1987) has shown that metaphors are rooted in embodied experi-
ence. Metaphor is understood as a mapping from bodily expe-
rience into more abstract domains. In CL bodily experience is
conceived of by a number of bodily schemata as container, path,
balance, force. They are understood as organizers of bodily expe-
rience that map this experience into more abstract domains. One
of the first proponents of this view was Johnson (1987) in a very
influential attempt to overcome philosophical cartesianism. This
line of reasoning was followed by publications viewing the body
as the prominent organizer of human experience (Gallagher,
2005; Hari, 2007), even in therapeutic theory (e.g., Lombardi,
2008). Johnson (1987) conceptualized a “metaphorical projec-
tion” according to which bodily experiences of “containing” were
“projected” in abstract domains as in sentences like “Let’s go into
this topic now”—the topic itself is formatted as a container and
the proposal is to enter this container. Other sentences like “my
future lies before me” project the bodily experience of moving
in a physical space onto the construction of a “time as a path”-
metaphor. The viewing of a relationship as “balanced” is directly
taken from the toddler’s experience of balancing one’s body when
standing up and learning to walk. A special part of Lakoff ’s theory
of metaphor (Lakoff, 2008) details this mapping from neural the-
ory via experienced embodiment into abstract thinking. Thus, a
new theory of metaphor has emerged based in embodied expe-
rience (Glucksberg, 2008). This is paralleled by quite similar
developments in CA.
This has consequences for the conception of empathy.
Empathy over a long time has been thought as something an
“empathizer” applies to the one “empathized.” Neisser (1980)
wondered why so much experimentation and theorizing consid-
ered participants as “passive onlookers” (p. 603) interested in
science-like theory-testing. Schlicht (2013) criticizes the method-
ological individualism of this thinking and, in parts, experimen-
tation. In real-life it is important for me to understand the other
person correctly and not only “test” my theory about the other’s
“theory.”
The rationalistic bias of MEO is to be overcome as it is
two bodies talking-in-interaction. Neither cognition nor empa-
thy is an individualistic endeavor. And conversation is not
“verbal behavior” transmitting coded messages to a decoding
receiver. This outdated terminology led research to technical
MEO-orientations. What was overlooked is that there are bod-
ies thinking, talking and constructing opportunities for empathy
(and blocking).
CA is not only interested in a semantic dimension of talk, but
more in the organizational level. When we follow this line of rea-
soning that “turn-taking” is the cradle of meaning (Schegloff,
1999) we can track the continuity from deeply embodied early
infant proto-conversations to adult discourse on high levels of
symbolic encounter. Sequencing, repair-activities, synchrony of
gestures and a lot of other features is as present in adult as in
mother-infant conversation (Braten, 2009). Embodiment-theory
talks of “emergence” (Brinich, 1982; Varela, 1990; Colunga and
Smith, 2003; Tschacher and Bergomi, 2011).
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How do people manage not to interrupt each other all the
time? How do they deal with “trouble” (if someone does not
reciprocate greetings or does not answer questions)? How do they
know what can be said and what not (e.g., telling a dirty joke,
Sacks, 1978)? The overall assumption is “order-at-every-point”
which means that talk entails orderliness which participants pro-
duce and use to make sense of their interaction continuously. To
hesitate in responding, to accompany the other party’s talk with
“confirmation utterances” or information receipt tokens (hm,
hm), to withdraw your gaze, or raising your voice for a moment
become significant events in order to produce meaning of the
interaction itself—by the participants. Astonishingly, voice as the
embodied producer of meaning per se is seldom paid attention to
neither in clinical nor in research papers in psychotherapy (see
Weiste and Peräkylä, 2013, for an exception).
Talk-in-interaction is hardly imaginable without embodied
voice. It is one of the most surprising things that all ther-
apists’ unavoidably most used tool, talking-using-voice, has
hardly found any research interest in the therapeutic sphere.
Conversation analysts (Streeck, 2011) observe in finegrained
detail how bodily movements of hand, gaze and body pos-
ture in everyday conversation contributes to the organization
of talking and understanding. To speak of “mindful hands” as
Jürgen Streeck (2011) does, could in therapeutic contexts become
complemented by an observation of “mindful voice”—clinicians
know how a voice can calm and sooth, attack and heal, prepare a
carpet of empathy in a dialog or make everything said unaccept-
able. The analysis of multimodal metaphor has begun to include
bodily gestures and the analysis of voice (Forceville and Urios-
Aparisi, 2009; Cienki and Müller, 2010) and this converges with
more recent studies in CA. Here is an enormous potential for
future studies.
Production and usage of orderliness is compatible with “con-
struing in action” as we have learned since Daniel Stern’s classic
“Interpersonal world of the infant” and his following excursions
into the moments of meeting between adults (Stern, 1985, 2004;
Leitner, 2007; Cipolletta, 2013). I will comment more exten-
sively on what baby observation and conversation analysts have
in common.
CA approaches can best be understood by demonstrating how
it is done. Up to now CA has hardly been applied to a huge
amount of verbal data for statistical analysis. CA demonstrates
results by extensively presenting verbal data in transcribed form
and showing how these data can be analyzed when participants
try to make sense of their interaction.
Thus, CAwill be used here in order to analyze psychotherapeu-
tic talk-in-interaction. It has been applied to a lot of areas (e.g.,
medical communication, conversation in court, laughter, repair
activities, emotion talk etc.) and is now shown to reveal undiscov-
ered aspects of psychotherapeutic activity (Peräkylä et al., 2008).
Sidnell and Stivers (2013) provide an extensive introduction to
the method (for a short look see my review of this volume,
Buchholz, 2013). What we don’t have is a full precise descrip-
tion of psychotherapy on a conversational level, although this task
is begun (Peräkylä et al., 2008). Here the dynamic system aspect
comes into view. My first example will show the ups and downs
of a wave-like interactional exchange.
EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1: WAVES OF DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE
I take as a first approach a transcribed example from Thomä
and Kächele (1994, chap. 4.1) where the patient Nora comes
5min late to a session, something which is not normal for her.
The emotional situation between her and the analyst is clearly
described:
“When she finally arrived, I was surprised to see her smiling and
beaming with happiness; upon entering the room, she looked
at me longer than customary and in an inquisitive manner. Her
happiness and my displeasure created a very discordant contrast.”
Then the dialog is transcribed1 as follows:
P: Well, what’s actually preoccupying me, I think, was the last
comment I made before I left, about paying, which was also
the topic of the previous hour, and I just thought it was rather
telling that precisely that same topic was the last point in the
conversation I just had with my boyfriend, although initially
we had talked about something entirely different.
We are informed that she quarreled with her boyfriend in a
restaurant about paying for the coffee, a quarrel which she
described as “a back-and-forth like in a ball game (Hin und Her
wie ein Ballspiel).” Using this metaphor of a ball game she uses an
embodied activity as the source of imagination and this becomes
a metaphor for this therapeutic discourse.
She remarks that still something is going on. She wonders
whether she might be happily smiling either because she had left
her therapist waiting or because of the situation in the restaurant.
The question of who pays for what, she muses, had been a topic
in the last therapy session, too. So several contexts of “paying” are
brought together here. The transcript continues:
P: Now today. . . I’ll play it where it’s about speakingmy thoughts,
holding them back, then with the bills and. . . I’m wondering
whether there is a connection with my being late.
A: Hum, I’d think so.
P: You’d think so. Ok, so I take away time. It’s just, I actually
also divide it up differently, and so my boyfriend and I were
together a little longer.
A: We recently spoke about you wanting to give a good whopping
to your boyfriend, and today it’s my turn.
P: Yeah, I enjoy it.
A: And that’s why you were beaming at me like that when you
came in.
The focus of attention shifts to an expansion of the metaphor of
game and play affected with a waving air of amusement and fun.
She then connects this with interactional scenes, but she does not
yet take full responsibility as she speaks in a non-actor mode: “my
1Timo Buchholz (based on the English-Version of Thomä and Kächele vol. II)
retranslated the transcript-parts from German into English.
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being late” instead of “I came late”2. The analyst reacts in a dif-
fuse manner, and his utterance is hedged by an alignment token:
“hum,” he aligns with the patient’s pleasure in the game.
Then, this game successfully rearranges itself in the interac-
tion, the patient responds with “You’d think so” in a playful
manner. Now she moves on in an actor’s responsibility mode: “I
take away time,” pre-announced by the compliance token “Ok.”
To take time away is a cultural metaphor, as if time were a thing
that can be taken away. Again, the source of this metaphor is an
embodied experience (“take something away”). Regarding this,
the therapist responds: “today it’s my turn.” He responds within
the metaphorically created domain of a ball game.
Here now the pleasure (“I enjoy it”) of “taking away some-
thing” appears on the scene. In the German original version the
therapist uses a strong metaphor in a humorous way in response
to the cheerful tone of the patient, namely “überbraten,” evok-
ing the image of being whacked over the head with a frying pan,
in order to describe what it is she seems to be taking pleasure
in when interacting both with him and her boyfriend—a new
self-description (instead of ball game) of what happens in this
conversation appears taken from another embodied source.
What we find is a very complex move in order to empathize
with the patient consisting of several steps: we see the embodied
patterns of observing and being observed (see my introduction)
when the therapist describes the study of the patient’s face. Here
we can focus on the ebb-and-flow waves of the conversation when
these observations become part of the conversation. We see a) an
alignment of the therapist; b) enrichment by other interactional
scenes having the effect of a “go-ahead!” directed at the therapist;
c) the therapist’s response with another enrichment (“we recently
spoke about. . . ”); d) return to the initial observation when the
patient came in; now this observation becomes a common object
of conversation.
Although the therapist (emotionally) disaffiliates with the
patient’s being late he (conversationally) aligns with an expansion
of metaphor and with “hum.” By the steps described a new way
is paved toward a new shared conversational space. It is not only
a new object (“being late”), but a new level of consideration for
each others’ concerns is co-established (i.e., the meaning of being
late). In everyday conversation being late is expected to be a sub-
ject to reproach. Obviously, the therapist feels an inclination to
this as we are informed in extra-conversational comments. But in
his utterances during the conversation he manages to affiliate and
to initiate a new level of conversational consideration.
The therapist then comments on his own participation:
“I [the therapist] shared my impression with the patient to make
it clear to her how much she enjoyed coming late and how much
pleasure she had acting out aggressive impulses.”
The therapist’s initial anger at being left waiting (reported in the
comments only) seems to be overruled by the patient’s fun in this
2This distinction is not meant as a linguistic one; in German the difference is
stronger than in English. In any case it is the responding analyst treating this
difference as relevant.
game. The patient finds a new metaphor for her pleasure letting
the therapist wait. The transcript continues:
P: [Laughing] Honestly—and I think that’s where the expression
is coming from—this gives me a feeling of devilish pleasure.
The German phrase “diebisches Vergnügen” (lit. “thievish plea-
sure”) here should be understood as “fiendish (or devilish)
pleasure.” Affect and behavior are now linked in this illicit-
fiendish or forbidden pleasure; the patient’s repelled aggression
was expressed both in her pleasure and in the fact that her behav-
ior for the moment had been at the expense of the relationship to
the therapist.
A: Yes, that’s clear, and you let yourself have this pleasure. But I’m
not very sure whether you also see the consequences of your
pleasure.
P: Yes, well, the question of “What do I get out of it?” I haven’t
so far asked myself yet. But when I raise it now, then I do
think that acting this way I gain your attention, because you
might think “What’s keeping her?” or something of the sort,
and then I also realize how I react if someone else is late. It
actually annoys me a good bit.
A: Hum, you seem sure of that.
P: That it annoys me. But that it annoys others, I don’t want to
know too much about that.
A: Isn’t just that the source of your pleasure, that you can get
people quite upset in a seemingly innocent manner.
What we have here is the emergence of equifinal meaning
(Donnellon, 1996). Two speakers starting from different points
for “moments of meeting” (Stern, 2004) arrive at a plateau
of consensual understanding that is quickly left again. This I
call the convergence of meaning. In everyday talk most peo-
ple assume that convergence of meaning is the ultimate goal
of conversation. This is, obviously, one side of the commu-
nicative coin only. If meaning converges, conversation ends.
Convergence of meaning cannot last long. It is achieved when
patient and analyst agree that to let someone wait is an enjoyable
pleasure.
Now a contrary maneuver starts. The therapist disturbs
the convergence of meaning by diverging conversation; he says
that today it is his turn. He is the one made upset as the
patient violated the rules of the “ball game.” Ball games are
ruled by mutuality, and who violates the rules is stopped, the
other player can restart the game. This is embodied inter-
action although, on the level of verbal exchange, nothing
seems to happen but talking. The rules of embodied inter-
action are absorbed into the more abstract domain of verbal
exchange—and both speakers follow these embodied rules (see
Figure 1).
This is the part the patient did not want to see (“I don’t
want to know too much about that”). Is there another interpreta-
tion possible that the patient is simply not concerned about her
behavior’s effects on others? 3 I would object that the patient’s
3As an unknown reviewer helpfully asked.
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FIGURE 1 | Course of a conversational wave dance.
overall readiness to debate the whole topic speaks against such
a view. This readiness is communicated to the therapist and he
can refer to it by diverging, which adds a new meaning to the
conversation.
The conversational strategies used to produce equifinal mean-
ing can be described as follows:
(a) Metaphors (e.g., game and play, “überbraten”) are used here
in order to reconcile diverging opinions.
(b) Logical arguments: premise and conclusion are here used as
rhetorical figures in order to mutually promote the other
person’s agreement.
(c) Modulation of affect: a sequence where one speaker starts
with the expression of affect which is then either expanded
upon or constrained by the next speaker.
(d) Linguistic indirectness: some use of passive constructions
indicating some denial of agency, mitigators (“Hum, I think
so,” “perhaps”), imprecise articulations which prove as help-
ful to continue conversation.
The conversation here begins with an affective discordant
experience, conversation diverges: the therapist has no pleasure
while he is waiting for his patient. The patient comes with a
smile on her face—a maximum of divergence. Being late and the
mutually recognized affect is the “action” that has to be debated.
Convergence begins at this level of being prepared to commonly
debate this divergence. Hereby certain conversational strategies
reduce the affective disalignment.
Both participants use the conversational strategies described
and add diverging semantic and, more importantly, affective
meaning to how the “action” is to be understood. They finally
achieve equifinal meaning, they converge4—and in the next move
they start again to diverge from this point in order to begin
a run through the same complex conversational pattern again.
Convergence is just a momentary plateau of rest which is imme-
diately given up in order to continue conversation.
This pattern cannot be reduced to properties of one of the
participants or to a method “applied” by one participant to the
next. One might say that a skillful therapist imagines this kind of
experience as a kind of advanced organizer and strives to accom-
plish something like it, but the therapist cannot “make” it happen.
What is needed is the special kind of empathic cooperation that
can be described easily bymusical metaphors: there is a wave-like
rhythm of convergence and divergence between the two speakers,
there are phases of affective resonance (differentiated in them-
selves between consonance and dissonance) and there is the aim
to keep the relationship as a whole in balance, so that the coopera-
tive work of meaning making can be continued. This constitutes a
conceptual difference to what is called “alliance ruptures” because
we can see here how the cooperative structure in general is main-
tained despite the divergence of meanings. The conversation as a
whole is more a kind of play than an “exchange of information,”
one can sense affective resonance even in the transcribed version.
There is a methodological difference between what psy-
chotherapists think they do and what can be observed when
they open their doors for scientific observation via audio or
video recordings. Even in psychoanalysis it is becoming clear that
4My terms of convergence and divergence have something in common with
the more general terms of affiliation and disaffiliation (Muntigl et al., 2013).
These terms set the accent to the emotional experience, my terms to the con-
versational exchange making visible the wave movement of conversation here
(Thanks to an unknown reviewer for this hint).
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self-description of professional work can only be one side of the
coin (Canestri, 2011). The other side is “doing.” In interaction
and conversation one cannot predict which “effect” an “interven-
tion” will have, since this prediction, even if made silently, very
quickly becomes part of the conversation and interaction and is
responded to. There is no simple way “from cognition in one
mind to conversation between two minds” (Potter, 1998; Coulter,
2005; Goodwin, 2007; Holt and Clift, 2007; Spurrett and Crowley,
2010; Deppermann, 2012). The methodological view used here
originates from CA. As Harvey Sacks (1992, part I, p. 11) put it:
“When people start to analyze social phenomena, if it looks like
things occur with the sort of immediacy we find in some of these
exchanges, then, if you have to make an elaborate analysis of it—
that is to say, show that they did something as involved as some
of the things I have proposed—then you figure that they couldn’t
have thought that fast. I want to suggest that you have to forget that
completely. Don’t worry about how fast they’re thinking. First of
all, don’t worry about whether they’re thinking. Just try to come
to terms with how it is that the thing comes off. Because you’ll find
that they can do these things.”
Surprisingly, one can find empirical evidence supporting this
position. Similar to what conversation analyst Heritage (2002)
described, in a study on “the pull of hostility” in therapeutic
discourse (von der Lippe et al., 2008) a new design was created
in order not to ascribe “hostility” to either the therapist or the
patient. From a pool of 373 fully transcribed therapies 28 were
selected. 14 Therapies were successful and 14 not. These cases had
been treated by 14 therapists. From each therapist, one case with a
successful outcome and one non-successful one were analyzed. In
this way, neither positive nor negative outcome could be reduced
to personal properties of the therapist. The transcribed sessions
were analyzed with the “Structural Analysis of Social Behavior”
(SASB, Benjamin, 1974, 1996, 2010) and the authors find
“that in successful therapy therapist and client follow each other,
as in a dance (i.e., the overall balance of positive and negative affil-
iation can be predicted for one by knowing the other), while this
harmony decreases over time in treatment failures” (p. 429)
There follows an important observation:
“It seemed to be in the dialogue itself that the constructive or
unconstructive therapeutic climate was created.”
This is a helpful remark to bear in mind when looking at my
next examples.
EXAMPLE 2: AN INTERPLAY OF RESONANCE
Sometimes in therapeutic conversation therapists formulate their
utterances with pre-announcements like “You think that. . . ”
Linguistic observers of therapeutic discourse (Scarvaglieri,
2011a,b) found that many therapeutic utterances start with
incomplete half-sentences in the format of “. . . that you felt loved”
or “. . . that you thought this was an attack.” Therapeutic dis-
course here makes use of a strategy that can be observed in
everyday contexts, too. But therapists seem to speak in this ellip-
tic mode more often. Completing the other’s utterance seems to
be a means to achieve various aims: (a) to move oneself into
resonance; (b) to propel conversation forward; and (c) to help
the client to overcome assumed obstacles. Clients often react
with signs of relief when they hear another speaker articulating
thoughts they never dared to utter. The therapeutic relation-
ship then is in resonance. The experience of being understood
in most cases is felt to be helpful; sometimes it is also what
clients fear.
What if this kind of intervention fails? I want to compare
two different examples treated by different therapists. In the
second example I will show how a skillful therapist managed
to be allowed to articulate what he felt in resonance with his
client in a first interview, as the therapist’s utterances with pre-
announcements like “You think. . . ” were eagerly accepted and
followed by the client’s responses.
Here I show how a therapist5 completes the utterances of the
client in a seemingly skillful way, but the whole conversation
quickly deteriorates into a turn-taking fight. I want to find out
if therapists can be given hints how to discern such moments and
react differently.
P: und das hat mir auch jetzt=im=nachhinein (.) sehr leid
getan daßi:ch das
and also now in retrospect (.) I felt very sorry that I
nicht (.) äh geschafft hab=die Zeit dort (..) sinnvoll für
mich zu gestalten
didn’t (.) uh manage to use my time over there (..) in a
meaningful way for me
oder (.) sprich ich mein (−) ich kannte ja da meine
Freundin schon und
or (.) say I mean (−) at that time I already knew my girl-
friend and
vorher hatte ich eine andere (lacht etwas) Freundin, so
daßich also immer
before I had another (laughs a little) girlfriend, so that actu-
ally I always
(..) da über’s Wochenende heimgefahren bin? und au:ch,
mit dem Ziel?
went home there over the weekend? and also with the aim?
◦unter der Woche sehr viel◦ gelernt? oder sprich eben die
Arbeit versucht
◦studied a lot during the week?◦ or let’s say well tried to
hab zu erledigen di::e (.) so=sein=muß=
finish the work that (.) should be done
−→T: = um=dann=a:m Samstag=[Sonntag,
in order to then Saturday [Sunday,
P: [=genau.
[exactly.
5Many thanks to Horst Kächele, Berlin, for the audio record I used for tran-
scription. Pauses are indicated by (.) for a length of less than 0.2 seconds; (..) is
a pause of 0.2–0.4 s and (−) is a pause of 0.5–0.9 s length; numbers in brack-
ets, e.g. (2) indicate a pause of 2 s. Quiet speaking phases are marked by ◦. . . ◦.
Latching is indicated by = which means that no discernible silence between
two turns could be detected. Lengthened syllables are indicated by a colon:.
Overlaps are indicate by [.
This is a very reduced version of transcription rules normally used in CA-
papers. For a full description of the CA approach to transcription see Hepburn
and Bolden (2013).
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T: = heimfahren zu können=um [da:nn
be able to drive home, in order to [then
P: [ja
[yes
T: nicht arbeiten zu müssen,=
not to have to work
P: =ja genau! und das war irgendwo ein Stück wei::t ein
Fehler? Wenn ich
yes exactly! and that was somehow a mistake to a degree? If
I
je:tzt=zurück[schau
now look [back
−→T: [und Sie denken jetzt (..) das Heimfahren haben Sie
[and you’re thinking now (..) going home you
gemacht um nicht allein sein zu müssen.
did that so you wouldn’t to have to be alone.
P: ja! bestimmt mit auch.
yes! definitely also that.
T: in ∗2. (Ortsname)
in ∗2 (place name)
P: bestimmtmit auch. obwohl ich eigentlich ziemlich schnell
Kontakt
definitely also that. even though I was actually pretty fast
gefunden hab gell,
in making contact wasn’t I,
T: ja,
yes,
The student who came for therapeutic help because of some
obsessive compulsive disturbance here talks about how he suf-
fered from not being able to use his time meaningfully. He had a
girlfriend at the time—but he still had to study and do his chores.
Here it can be easily seen how therapist and client complement
each other’s utterances. They talk like one mouth speaking—
probably another aspect of embodied talk-in-interaction not too
often observed in everyday interactions. This goes so far that the
therapist can say “and you’re thinking now,” and the client accepts
and agrees succinctly. CA (Schegloff, 2007a,b) has developed a
way of describing turn-taking mechanisms according to which
interruptions and overlaps are handled by participants as a kind
of “trouble” demanding repair activities to restore the order of
turn-taking. Remarkable, that these repair activities are not prac-
ticed here. In this first interview there are many passages in which
therapist and client seem to be in this kind of affective resonance
so that a new order of conversation emerges and the therapist can
complement the client’s utterances and vice versa. To be engrossed
at the conversational surface makes the phenomenon of reso-
nance appear. The following important aspect should be pointed
out: at the point where this interplay of resonance takes place, the
therapist takes himself back with the final “yes”—he moves back
into the position of a listener, not of a participant with directing
initiative.
EXAMPLE 3: FAILED RESONANCE
My third example is from another therapy conducted by a female
therapist with a male patient. I want to contrast these two exam-
ples in order to highlight some differences.
P: ja. (--) das hat sie ähm (--) aber das ich konnte ihr das
irgendwie nicht (--)
yes (- -) that she did um (- -) but that to her I somehow
couldn’t (-)
das war schon berechtigt also das war jetzt nicht über-
trieben oder so und
that was actually justified well it wasn’t excessive or so and
sie hat auch nicht (--) sie hats mir verboten wie es Frauen
verbieten
she didn’t either (- -) she forbade me to do it like women
forbid things
((lacht)) das tut mir weh ich möcht das nicht ((lacht))
also ähm
((laughs)) that hurts I don’t want that ((laughs)) so um
−→ (15.0)
T: also die hat Angst dass sie sie verlieren könnte,
so she’s afraid that she might lose you,
−→P: ja, (3.0) das äh (9.0) doch es ist irgendwie schon ja das hat
sie
yes, (3.0) that uh (9.0) yeah somehow actually yes she is
(27.0)
For readers it will be difficult to understand what’s the subject
matter here. However, that is less important than the organizing
turn taking activity: the client closes his first remark with a token
indicating that he wants to continue. But the pause of 15 s disturbs
the turn taking routine. On the semantic level the client’s mes-
sage did not come to a natural transitionally relevant point. On
the performative level of turn taking the client indicates that the
next speaker might take the turn. Thus, the client exposes the ther-
apist to an interesting form of contradictory behavior. Should the
therapist take the turn or not?
The therapist now starts his utterance with the same word the
client ended and continues with what (the therapist thinks) the
client might have intended to say. The client continues with an
agreement token followed by a long pause (3 s), restarts to take
the turn, pauses again (9 sec) and does not finish his sentence.
Another example from the same session reveals that this is an
interactional pattern between the two participants:
P: ja, das kann sein also das ist jetzt glaub ich noch zu kurz (---)
um das
yes, that could be well I think that’s still a little too short (- -) to
sagen zu können aber
be able to say that but
(6.0)
T: aber trotzdem könnte diese (---) war eben so mein Gedanke
ob das nicht
but nonetheless this could (- - -) I just had the thought if this isn’t
äh bei Anke ein bisschen ich will nicht sagen Angst macht aber
doch
uh for Anke a little I don’t wanna say frightening but yes
nicht nur nicht nur ähm Freude macht.
not only not only uh: enjoyable.
Again the patients ends his contribution with a semantically open
clause and a performative “long” pause of 6 s. This makes it
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unclear to the therapist whether this is a transitionally relevant
point for turn taking or not. And, just as in the previous part,
the therapist starts by taking over the client’s last word. This
pattern occurs several times during this session so that, 2min
later, we see the following escalation of “trouble” and turn-taking
disorganization:
P: also ich versuche da keinerlei Rivalität rein zu bringen
aber (---) äh ich
so well I try not to bring any rivalry into it but (- -) uh I
nehme das schon wahr wenn das von ihm so zum Beispiel
mal ein
do notice it if for example occasionally from his side
bisschen kommt also (---) ich hab glaube ich das letzte
mal erzählt von
he does it a bit so (- - -) I think the last time I talked about
vor zehn Tagen das Wochenende (---) da wo die beiden
sehr stark
the weekend from ten days ago (- - -) when the two of them
very much
ausgerastet sind so (---) äh
threw a tantrum so (---) uh
(4.0)
da (--) hab ich schon so ein bisschen gedacht er
will schon wissen was
at that moment (- -) I did actually think a little like he does
want to know what
los ist oder er will irgendwie (6.0) ja gestern sind wir mit
dem (--)
is going on or he wants to somehow (6.0) yeah yesterday
with the (-)
gestern, vorgestern? gestern sind wir mit dem Auto äh
zum Hockey
yesterday, the day before? yesterday we drove to the hockey
training by car
gefahren weil die beiden jetzt auch mal gucken wollten
und sind da mit
because the two of them eventually wanted to have
a look too and drove gefahren und (--) äh da hab ich
saßich vorne und hab den Arm um ∗
with me and (- -) uh I did I sat in the front and put my arm
around ∗
(---) ähm Sitz gemacht und da kam von hinten so ein
kleiner Klopfer also
(- - -) um seat and then from behind a little knock came so
−→ [()]
−→T: [()]
−→P: [()]
T: [()] gehn Sie weg von
get away from
meiner Frau
my wife
P: nja, (2.0) äh also von ihm her sicherlich nicht bewusst
sondern es war so
hum (2.0) uh well surely not consciously on his part but it
was like
von ihm her so ne Art spielen () das
on his part a kind of playing () that
(3.0)
T: hm=hm,
hm=hm,
This is an example where something does “not work,” obvi-
ously; the therapist tries to complete the patient’s utterances and
overrides the rules of turn-taking. Two observations serve to
be mentioned: (a) after this happened several times during the
session a kind of disorganization in turn taking makes repair
activities relevant; (b) it is interesting that the patient announces
this event in a metaphorical fashion before it happens (“I try not
to bring any rivalry into it”).
The arrows mark the escalation of a “rivalry fight” for the right
to take the turn. It was impossible to transcribe more precisely as
there are simply sounds of starts and interrupting but not a single
understandable word. Instead of continuing the other’s thought
as in Example 2, here we see an escalation of rivalry. This is a term
presented by the patient itself. From an embodiment point of view
one might reason that he sensed the rivalry in turn-taking in the
paragraphs presented before. Turn-taking is the cradle of mean-
ing. It is an embodied activity, using breath, a common focus of
attention for an orderly sequence of interaction and energizing
the body for the preparation of an interruption, when one wants
to take the turn not only at transition relevant points. This bod-
ily experience he termed “rivalry,” using a bodily experience of
fighting. The embodied source domain again is projected into the
more abstract domains.
In the first example one could see how the therapist manages
to emotionally affiliate and conversationally align with the patient
followed by the emergence of a new level of commonly focused
attention. Here, in Example 3, the establishment of a new con-
versational level is not achieved. Emotional resonance is put out
of use, turn taking is unbalanced and the rhythm of the talk is
disorganized.
By further contrasting these examples we find the following
results. Such processes cannot be considered to be therapeutic
“failures” in the sense that a therapist does not want to help. The
client disorganizes the transitionally relevant point in a character-
istic manner: semantic non-continuation and long pauses effect
a disturbance in the therapist’s reactivity. How to respond? It is
the best intentions of the therapist, namely to intervene helpfully,
that contribute here to the unintended effect of disorganizing the
talk. The transitionally relevant point is semantically unmarked
but pragmatically offered—and so the therapist either by taking
the turn or not, has a good chance of failing. Whichever way the
therapist behaves, it could be considered as false. Often clients
complain after such conversational episodes that the therapist has
interrupted—but a close inspection of the record reveals that at
one level at least turn taking was offered.
There is a third option for the therapist in order to escape this
pragmatic paradox of false responding or false non-responding:
to consider silence as a response. If after a while the client might
complain about the silent therapist, one might describe one’s
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own silence as politeness, waiting for the client to complete the
sentence. And one could then ask what the client had inmind dur-
ing the long pauses. Ruptures are a co-production of both sides,
therapist and client alike (Safran and Muran, 2000; Lepper and
Mergenthaler, 2007). The study of detailed transcriptions might
help to identify and understand how to repair such ruptures. To
pay attention to such turn-taking organization might become a
part of training therapists.
EXAMPLE 4: REPAIR AND MIND READING
My next example stems from an everyday talk observed and ana-
lyzed by Paul Drew (2005, p. 170). Conversation analysts have
observed and widely demonstrated that conversation has a con-
sensus preference. It is for example easy to accept an invitation
for lunch but it is complicated to decline. “No” is an option that
forces the participant with conditional relevance to provide a jus-
tification, an explanation, some kind of account why “not.” The
format (put in square brackets) for an invitation refusal can be
described by three conversation moves:
[Appreciation] + [(mitigated) Declination] + [Account]
When invited, a speaker will first respond with an appreciative
remark, will then decline (more or less embedded in “softeners”)
and will subsequently provide an account as to why it is impos-
sible to accept the invitation. Here is an interesting example by
Drew (2005, p. 170):
(1) Emma: Wanna c’m do:wn ‘av [a bah:ta] lunch w]ith me?=
(2) Nancy: [◦It’s js] ()◦]
(3) Emma: =Ah gut s’m beer’n stu:ff,
(4) (0.3)
(5) Nancy: Wul yer ril sweet hon: uh:m
(6) (.)
(7) Emma: [Or d’y]ou’av] sup’n [else ◦ ()◦
(8) Nancy: [L e t] I:] hu. [n:No: I haf to: uh call Roul’s
mother, h I told’er I:’d call’er this morning...
Emma invites Nancy to come down “and have lunch with me”
and while talking Nancy does not interrupt her. There is an over-
lap (indicated by the brackets [and]): she is immediately starting
her (mitigated) refusal (line 2) calmly (indicated by ◦) but very
early, too. The calm voice is an embodied aspect of conversation
here; it indicates Nancy’s very early awareness of the whole format
and more, that her declination might hurt Emma and be followed
by a change of state of her relationship.
Emma quickly (indicated by =) adds an attractive offer that
she has “got some beer and stuff” (line 3) followed by a delay
(line 4). Then follows Nancy’s “appreciation” (line 5) addressed
not to the invitation but to the person of her friend Emma. Then
we have a short pause at a transition relevant point. Emma takes
the turn offering “or do you have something else” (line 7).
This is the interesting point here. Emma offers an alternative
account for Nancy’s refusal and Drew here makes an important
comment:
“This is a ‘cognitive moment,’ in a double sense: in order to make
that move, before Nancymakes explicit her declination, Emma has
to have realized that Nancy might be going to decline her invita-
tion; she thereby reads Nancy’s mind, attributing that intention to
her.” (Drew, 2005, p. 170)
Drew wants to point out here that “intention” is not only a
philosophical term but a practice performed by conversational
participants in order to ascribe motivation6. In order to under-
stand the process of mind-reading addressed here it is, of course,
not necessary to assume telepathic abilities. Their voices have
indicated declination and some repair activities. This observa-
tion can be extended to the assumption that both participants
have an unconscious knowledge of the standard format how to
refuse invitations among friends. This format is instantiated when
Nancy in line 2 calmly begins to speak, followed by Emma’s offer
of “beer’n stuff.” This must not be viewed as an intentional pres-
sure on Nancy to come. It is an alternative account for the refusal
Emma has sensed embodied with Nancy starting to speak in line
2. There is a common format steering this conversation and, of
course, this format is determined by a shared culture not by
cognition-in-one-mind (Cerulo, 2002; Miller, 2006). Part of these
cultural practices is to organize conversation and talk around eat-
ing. It is this cultural habit that allows Emma to anticipate Nancy’s
declination and try to get ahead by offering something better
for the body. Several aspects of embodiment (calm voice, attrac-
tive dinner and eating) and the use of distributed conversation
formats functionally operate together.
This example has something in common with my next one. In
the Emma-Nancy interaction, Nancy’s offer in line 5 can be seen
as a “third move.” The first one is the invitation, the second one is
the positive or negative response. The refusal, as Drew’s analysis
shows, is anticipated by Nancy’s remark in line 2 and so Emma
can insert the offer of line 5 in order to gain more acceptance
for her invitation. Following a first (calmly spoken) resonance,
Emma adjusts her invitation and this adjustment is influenced
by Nancy’s calm utterance. As Peräkylä (2010) has been able to
show, this immediate correction procedure is just what happens
in psychoanalytic therapy.
Braten (2009) shows how repair activities begin in preverbal
mother child interaction. Some of these repairs anticipate the
other’s (negative) state (a mother feeling that her baby’s body
feels pain when handled in a certain way) and react to events
that can, but must not happen. This feeling-the-other’s-body is an
embodied precursor of later conversational repair activities. There
is “doing empathy” in conversational repairs.
It is very inspiring to read how conversation analysts (Corrin,
2010) observe very similar patterns in early child talk with their
mothers. Helping and being-helped, asking and receiving an
answer, greeting and being greeted, smiling and smiling back are
examples for complete interactive patterns children acquire in
early childhood. These patterns are expanded with the advent of
language acquisition, then, they form expectations of how oth-
ers should behave. And this continues in everyday conversation
6Potter and Edwards (2013) refer to this example in order to convincingly
demonstrate that “intention” must be considered a mundane term; “inten-
tion” is not something to explain conversational practice. It is used by
participants themselves as “account.”
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between adults. Perhaps this might be, what Gregory Bateson
(1961) thought of in his notion of the “pattern connecting”
diverging minds.
EXAMPLE 5: THE “THIRD MOVE” AFTER AN INTERPRETATION
Annsi Peräkylä is professor for microsociology in Helsinki and
in addition a well-trained psychoanalyst. He has begun to pub-
lish a series of papers (Peräkylä, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2013)
on how psychoanalytic talk is being conducted beyond theoretical
self-descriptions of psychoanalytic colleagues.
Peräkylä (2010) used a corpus of 58 audio-recorded psycho-
analytic sessions involving two experienced psychoanalysts and 3
patients. Here is one of his examples. The female patient has a
partner who is seriously ill, the patient takes care of him and talks
about her experiences and feelings:
(1) P: As I had a dream that I had been (0.6) quite
(2) insane for a few days.
(3) (0.8)
(4) T: Yea[h.
(5) P: [so as one (0.4) as as one probably wants to
(6) (1.8) empathize the (1.6) patient in his (1.1)
(7) condition and his situation and and one wants to go
(8) along with it, (0.4) then (2.9) one goes too far.
(9) (6.2)
(10) T: Probably in the same time you also repress the.hhh the
(11) immense grief that [(arises) from that]
(12) P: [Yeah. then it is is] is ((clears throat))
(13) hh impossible.hhhh ((coughs)) to erm deal (0.2)
(14) really with (0.6) that grief because (.) one has to act
(15) all the time.
(16) (0.4)
(17) P: Or to be rational and to do dusting and to
(18) order (0.5) things from pharmacy and (0.8) and this and
that.
(19) (2.2)
(20) T: And on the other hand (0.6) you can also avoid the grief
(21) through this very action.
(22) (1.5)
(23) T: So that it works b- [both ways]
(24) P: [Yes, but as there is the]
(25) responsibility so it erm some [kind of act] ion has to be
(26) T: [yes]
(27) P: acc[omplished.]
(27) T: [It] has to be done necessarily.
The patient actively connects her being insane in her dream with
her partner’s insanity, proposing that this kind of excessive iden-
tification might reflect some kind of insanity on her behalf, too
(line 9: “one goes too far,” which is a metaphor using an embodied
experience). This prepares the way for the analyst’s activity—
Empathy cannot be thought as an “intervention” by an especially
gifted empathizing person “into” a less able person; empathy here
is clearly co-produced by both participants.
Obviously the body is present here, when the patient clears
throat after her grief has been addressed by the therapist. And she
uses bodily activities to (dusting) to avoid feeling sad.
The analyst addresses her active repression of grief when so
intensely identifying with her partner. While first agreeing with
“yeah” (line 12), the patient “then hastily moves into elabora-
tion” (lines 12 ff.). But there is a difference. While the patient
actively repressed her grief and tears, she talks about having “to
act all the time” (lines 14 and 15). Again, she uses her bodily
activities in order not to feel what the therapist tries to address.
This is followed by a transitionally relevant point (line 16), where
the analyst could have taken the turn, but keeps silent and so
the patient continues talking about dusting etc. (lines 17 ff.).
From line 20 onwards the analyst makes another interpretive turn.
Peräyklä thinks, the therapist proposes
“a new perspective by pointing out that focusing on practicalities
can also be a means for avoiding the grief. So, while ‘not grieving’
appeared in the patient’s elaboration as something imposed upon
the patient by the imperatives of the situation, in the analyst’s third
interpretative turn, avoidance of grief appears as the patient’s own
accomplishment, and the practicalities appear as instrumental in
realizing this choice. By emphasizing the patient’s agency or choice
in ‘not grieving,’ the analyst also returns to an aspect of his initial
interpretation where he suggested that the patient represses her
grief.” (p. 1378)
By starting with “on the other hand,” the analyst combines both
accepting the patient’s perspective and adding a new one.
“The combination of the acceptance of the patient’s elaboration
and the explicit perspective shift is also embodied in the way in
which the analyst, after the initial non-response by patient (line
22), pursues his suggestion in line 23. By pointing out that ‘so
that it works both ways,’ the analyst suggests that both are true:
that the patient is unable to grieve due to her responsibilities (per-
spective in the patient’s elaboration) and that the patient uses her
responsibilities to avoid grieving (perspective in the analyst’s third
interpretative turn).” (Peräkylä, 2010, p. 1378)
The artful operation of changing somebody’s perspective is here
skillfully handled by the turn-initial phrase “on the other hand”—
again an embodiedmetaphor. Therapists of every kind use similar
phrases without ever paying special attention as to how to ini-
tiate such an operation. But they do it successfully—by using
implicit cultural knowledge of how to respect their client’s view,
unconsciously referring to formats like in example 4 and 5, and
sometimes these operations open up a conversation to deep levels
of common empathizing (Example 2), while at other times they
fail, as in Example 3. Therapeutic conversation might be based
on formats of that kind—more than ever thought. Therapeutic
empathic skillfulness seems to be based in embodied knowledge
of how to use common cultural formats with respect to a patient’s
topics and at the same time they hurt the patient’s expectations,
they violate rules of conduct, don’t show respect for practicing
avoiding feelings and then there is a skillful readjustment and fine
attunement as repair activity of one’s own utterances. This skill-
ful handling of repair activities should be studied with greater
attention. I assume it is based in early experiences of embodied
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repair activities during infant proto-conversation. There is conti-
nuity form proto-conversation to higher levels of conversation in
using repairs.
In what follows I will turn to some evidence that could be used
in psychotherapy process research. This evidence is presented here
in the format of outlining some interdisciplinary lines of research
especially between infant observers and conversation analysts.
“EMPATHY IS BACK“
Examples 1, 3, and 5 might give an impression as to how
easily these complex therapeutic operations might fall apart.
Ruptures in emotional resonance might give birth to violent esca-
lations. Resonance, rhythm and balance should be considered
relevant dimensions of empathic interaction in psychotherapy.
In psychotherapy process research, the stage of understanding
therapeutic “interventions” as technological procedures to be
applied independent of the therapist-as-person should be over-
come. In their influential work Orlinsky and Ronnestad(2005, p.
5) observed:
“As a rule, the study of psychotherapies has been favored over the
study of psychotherapists—as if therapists, when properly trained,
are more or less interchangeable.”
They see this attentive paucity as founded in a modernistic
MEO-bias which led to the assumption that not the person
of the therapist but the standards of method, procedure and
technique are responsible for success or failure of the psychother-
apeutic endeavor—this is an example of disembodied thinking
viewed as a failure of research orientation. These assumptions
fall in line with scientific standards of rationality and objectivity.
What was termed personal equation from early astronomy (when
astronomers looked through telescopes their observations devi-
ated a little bit from one another) should be ruled out as a source
of error which was to be controlled by experimental design. This
disembodied kind of scientific understanding led to an elimina-
tion of the personal experience on the therapist’s side, and one
may wonder how this dimension should be brought back into
the process by a therapist trained in this kind of reasoning only.
Huge amounts of money were spent to research therapies—as if
they could be conducted independent of the therapist. The NIMH
study on depression conducted sophisticated statistical analyses
to decide this question, and it looks so far as if the “therapist
effects” had made the race (Elkin et al., 2006, 2007; Wampold
and Bolt, 2006, 2007; for an overview of this debate see Buchholz
and Gödde, 2012). It seems as if we meet a kind of paradox
here: within the statistical area of objective science its counter-
part, the embodied therapist’s personal element and subjectivity,
reappears. Since the publication of these results, many researchers
have turned their attention to the therapist.
This development is accompanied by a reappearance of empa-
thy in other areas than neurological research of mirror neurons.
I leave out this topic as so many others have written about it
with greater competence than I have. However, there are par-
allels in philosophy (Batson, 2011). Karsten Stueber (2006), a
German philosopher teaching in the United States for many years,
is well informed about the debates in German philosophy at the
beginning of the 20th century. Prominent names are Theodore
Lipps, who was highly respected by Freud; Max Scheler, who
gave “Einfühlung” a central position in his philosophy; Friedrich
Theodor Vischer, who saw empathic qualities as a presupposi-
tion for moral reasoning with respect to the different world views
of others. Their opponents, such as the founders of the Vienna
Circle, in those days were representatives of a more rationalis-
tic philosophy in many variants. Stueber accomplishes a heroic
task. He considers all the debates taking place at the time, brings
the opposing positions of the prominent philosophers into a dia-
log and manages to cite a lot of empirical research. Prominent
here is, of course, research onmirror neurons, the debate between
simulation theory and theory-of-mind-theory, the role of folk
psychology and cultural contextuality as opposed to explanatory
approaches. In Stueber’s analysis, MEO-conceptions of empathy
tend to misunderstand empathy as a kind of theoretical enter-
prise, the body is missed in his analysis, too. Philosophers from
the Wittgensteinian and hermeneutic tradition agree that empa-
thy cannot be conceptualized as an analog of theory. So they
replace the concept of empathy by “understanding” and this is
mostly fixed to a textual level (Stueber, 2006, p. 195).
Stueber comes to define the limits of empathy (see also Breyer,
2013) not by rationality; in his view it is folk-theoretical con-
ceptions that cannot sufficiently differentiate between correct
empathic perceptions and prejudicial forms of understanding.
Thus, certain constraints are to be acknowledged as in the case
of different cultures. Here, further cognitive strategies are to
be supplemented. But without empathic utterances everyday
social interaction would break down in seconds. This holds even
more for therapeutic conversation. Conversation, as I hope my
examples have demonstrated, is more than just the exchange of
propositions or mutual information about states in the world.
Conversation includes the body.
KNOWING AND FEELING (OF THE OTHER’S KNOWING)
The earlier opposition of naturalistic experimentation as the
“hard” version and hermeneutic understanding as the “soft” ver-
sion of practicing science is outdated. As philosopher Wolfgang
Detel (2011) states, in the current situation, perhaps surprisingly,
strong impulses for a mutual rapprochement come from recent
experimental evidence. I will give a line of experimental examples
relevant for the topic of embodiment here.
What follows is some linguistic experiments that aim at explor-
ing the psychological environment of certainty or uncertainty that
a speaker has when responding to a knowledge question. These
epistemic shades of gray envelop the content of the answer and
help the hearer decide how certain or uncertain the speaker is
with his answer. This look into the other’s mind is a link to empa-
thy. The disjunction between empathy and propositions is here
bridged as researchers take into account that what is important
is not only the information given, but the embodied person mak-
ing the utterance, or respectively the relationship of propositional
knowledge (information) and personal certainty or uncertainty.
Speakers indicate the degree of epistemic certainty of a propo-
sition with hedges, e.g., by introducing their utterance with
phrases like “I mean” or “as far as I know,” using adverbs “any-
how,” “probably,” employing modality (instead of saying: “this is
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so and so” they say “It might be that. . . ”), and through changes in
prosody (e.g., intonation, rhythm, and quality of voice). Not only
knowing exists, but a “feeling of knowing” (FOK), as Hart (1965)
termed it.
The assessment of the (un)certainty of an utterance can follow
a procedure of counting the linguistic indicators here mentioned
in a question-answer design (Smith and Clark, 1993). This design
was expanded upon when the researcher’s interest turned to “feel-
ing of another’s knowing” (FOAK), as in Brennan and Williams
(1995). These authors found that listeners use a lot of resources
to approximately assess a speaker’s (un)certainty: (a) use of one’s
own embodied knowledge as a measure; (b) the assessed degree
of question difficulty for the speaker as a tool to judge confidence;
(c) the degree of mutual knowledge; (d) how the speaker is known
or said to have performed in other environments previously; and
(e) linguistic surface features, such as (f) latency to respond, (g)
intonation, (h) forms of avoiding an answer etc. We find voice,
hesitation, avoiding as embodied measures perceived by the lis-
tener with sensitive ears. Krahmer and Swerts (2005) turned to
childrens’ ability to detect (un)certainty in videos. While adults
care a lot about uncertainty and, when uncertain, will increase
frequency of pause production, display a higher pitch of voice,
change intonation, lift their eyebrows and display an increase in
smiling responses (embodied responses), children don’t appear
to care too much about uncertainty. Self-presentation, these
authors conclude, is a less important thing for children than for
adults.
Dral et al. (2011) used textual markers vs. prosodic markers to
assess (un)certainty. They were looking for the possibility to auto-
matically detect (un)certainty by prosodic markers. As for textual
markers they differentiate hedges into different types such as
“shields” and “approximators.” “Shields” obviously are designed
to prevent failures and approximators are used as a politeness
strategy in the flow of conversation. This is context-dependent,
participants differentiate between these two. Embodied variables
of prosody such as intonation, latency of response, intensity of
voice and speed of talking were also put under scrutiny. They
conducted several statistical analyses on a dataset of 552 audio
files and in comparing the transcripts became optimistic that
“(un)certainty in spoken dialogs can be assessed automatically.”
The authors display a certain degree of optimism here. They find
that to approximate (un)certainty “the textual features obviously
score best” (p. 76). To a (unexpectedly) high degree, uncertainty
comes in the guise of assessment or suggestion.
These empirical and experimental results can be taken as
cues for the increasing attention given to the relevance of
embodiment-dimensions in linguistics, in psychotherapy process
research and in conversation analysis, too. New empathy-related
questions appear: not only what is spoken about (informational
content), but also who is speaking (the speaker’s “identity,” see
Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998), to what (recognized) contexts
a speaker responds (“situatedness”), to whom someone is talk-
ing (recipient design, see Hepburn and Potter, 2011; Hitzler,
2013) and the positioning of the body in the physical room
and dimension and the personal positioning in metaphorical
descriptions for interaction (e.g., ball game) seem to me to be
relevant dimensions for studying empathy.
As empathy like love can hardly be defined propositionally it
is advisable to follow the strategy of conversation analysts here.
These researchers don’t use pre-defined concepts to be applied
onto empirical data. They look for naturalistic data (Mondada,
2013) and study the various practices of empathy. The research
question is not ontologically directed to what empathy “is” but
to how empathy is “made” by participants in talk-in-interaction.
Empathy emerges as a co-production. Heritage (2011, 2012) and
Heritage and Lindström (2012), analyzing transcripts of every-
day interactions found that articulation formats of empathy can
be described. Following Goffman (1978) they analyzed “response
cries” like “Oh!” and “Ah:h!” by which people embodied the
expression of surprise, silent participation or follow the emo-
tional paths of up- and downgrading excitements. Response cries
(Hepburn and Potter, 2012) of that kind are articulated when you
hear something you know: how a tooth was extracted, the first
kiss or that somebody died.
Other conversational activities can be assigned to a “spectrum”
(Heritage, 2011, p. 164) of empathic responses. “Ancillary ques-
tions” are uttered when another empathic response to a story told
could be expected and the recipient of a story utters a kind of
related question expressing some affiliative engagement with the
teller. Ancillary questions have the power to refocus the matter
in a way the teller could not have expected. The recipient thus
opens a way to escape further conversational obligations in a sin-
gle move. Often a teller cannot decide from ancillary questions
how empathically engaged the recipient is.
This is different with “parallel assessments.” Respondents “can
focus on focal elements of the experience described by the teller,
by describing a similar, but particularized, experience or prefer-
ence” (Heritage, 2011, p. 168). Someone praises the asparagus pie
prepared by Jeff and the respondent utters something like “I love
it. ◦Yeah I love tha:t.” He takes a “my side”-response in Heritage’s
term. There is a dilemma emerging in this kind of empathic
affiliation with others:
“On the one hand, the recipient has not had direct first-hand expe-
rience of the event reported, and a parallel ‘my side’ response risks
being heard as flat, pallid or pro forma. On the other hand, a par-
allel assessment that is too florid, extended or enriched in detail
. . . risks being heard as competitive with the very report that it is
designed to affiliate with.” (Heritage, 2011, p. 169)
Parallel assessment is a term to express the experience of “I know
how this feels” or “I felt like you.” Heritage’s goes beyond this
and shows what a risky stuff lies in this kind of responding.
Responding that way might be perceived as a contest about who
might enjoy the privilege to continue telling. In therapeutic con-
texts the most conventional form of parallel assessments might be
utterances like “I know that, too,” “yes, I do understand that” or
the compliance token “hm:hm.”
On a higher level of empathic responses he finds what he terms
as “subjunctive assessment.”
“With the term subjunctive assessments, I mean to introduce efforts
at empathic affiliation which suggest that if the recipient were to
experience the things described they would feel the same way.”
(p. 169)
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Think of someone telling of a wonderful meal and then
changing the receipt in a certain respect and the recipient
responds with “Oh yeah! This would be fantastic!” He never has
eaten themeal prepared in this way but he answers in advance as if
he would have; thus, presenting an evaluation of this experience
in the conditional. Both use their body (mouth) to simulate an
experience they have not yet had—and affiliate on that. The sub-
junctive mode expresses a time mode of futurum II, something
that has not yet happened is treated as if it happened and can be
evaluated as something in the past. In therapeutic contexts sub-
junctive assessments might appear when talking about a clients
wish-fulfillents and future aims.
Heritage offers a further level:
“By ‘observer responses,’ I mean to indicate responses in which
recipients claim imaginary access to the events and experiences
described, but position themselves as observers, or would-be
observers, to the event.” (P. 171)
With this format a listener takes the position of an imaginary
or belated witness. In therapeutic contexts this might often hap-
pen when treating traumatized patients who suffer from having
experiences nobody saw or listened to and thus are threatened by
derealiziation of their experience.
Applying this schema of empathic response spectrum Kächele
and Buchholz (2013) showed that in an emergency SMS-therapy
different empathic reactions could be differentiated in their
effects to the client. But it would be a serious error to assume
that such formats of empathic responses could be deliberately
“applied” in order to achieve certain effects in the other person.
This is misunderstanding of the whole thinking and approach.
No, what researchers find is the opposite of deliberate applica-
tion. It “just happens” that people react that way. They have a
feeling for what reactions and answers fit into the situation and
in contexts. This feeling is a resonance evoked by such situa-
tions and contexts and only après coup this can be analyzed by
a scientific observer. Being in resonance, Heritage finds in his fur-
ther contributions is complemented by a balance of knowledge
between participants. Someone mentioning a name never used
before will immediately recognize if the person referred to is not
known to the listener. He has a “knowledge surplus” (K+), the
listener lacks this person reference (K-). Heritage (2012) specu-
lates that to equalize this epistemic difference is a mighty impetus
why people are in interaction. So the first speaker who realizes
that “Peter” is unknown to the listener will immediately add the
relevant knowledge (“Peter, my neighbor at the left side”) and
knowledge difference is equalized. Balance is one of the embod-
ied schemata Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) have proposed
as a source domain for so many target domains—this concep-
tion is applied here when Heritage describes how the knowledge
difference is restored. Balancing is part of the universal cooper-
ative structure of conversation (Grice, 1975; Tomasello, 2008).
Affiliation is increased on both sides by such inobtrusive means.
Interestingly, this small conversational operation cannot be
repeated. If someone in the same conversation were to add a sec-
ond “Peter, my neighbor at the left side” this would show that
here, too, is the potential for risky stuff. The same conversational
operation is never the same. This contributes to the conviction
that conversational contributions cannot be thought of as appli-
cables. In the FOK and FOAK-terminology one could say this
would hurt the balance of knowing and feeling between, at least,
two participants. This reasoning makes plausible that balancing is
a genuine embodied source domain that cannot be replaced easily.
TOWARD A DEFINITION OF EMPATHY
The most surprising result seems to be that people employ
all these dimensions, react via different channels (textual or
prosodic, eye gaze or affective facial displays) and integrate them
at high speed. In most instances of everyday experience this suf-
fices to achieve sufficiently reliable conclusions about trustwor-
thiness of conversational partners. This type of research results
supports a view that transcends neurological and information
processing approaches, where it does not suffice to correlate expe-
rience and the activity of the brain. Correlational thinking would
simply accentuate the gap between what a neurologist and what
a psychologist studies. Empathy is the vehicle by which human
beings, with their basically embodied enormous capacity for coordi-
nation, integration and organized movement, can create their own
environment with respect to the other’s state, context and situated-
ness. The single organism’s helplessness can be overcome by these
abilities. From this evolutionary moment empathy alters environ-
mental morphostasis to environmental morphogenesis which we
perceive as cultural plasticity. Culture never is a single individual’s
product alone. To quote Whitehead (1929, p. 1):
“Culture is activity of thought, and receptiveness to beauty and
humane feelings. Scraps of information have nothing to do
with it.”
Culture has more to do with “feelings of knowing” and “feelings
of the other’s knowing” than with knowing/information alone.
Infant researcher Colwyn Trevarthen (2003, p. 76) stresses this
difference with great emphasis and points to a perceived error of
research activity emerging from ignorance of this difference:
“In Edinburgh our Computational Linguists seem to have lost
all interest in communication. The study of grammar cannot
progress that way. It just gets more and more complex. But, as
soon as you start to relate grammar to these spontaneous rhythmic
characteristics of mother and baby communicating, then gram-
matical syntax gains a new meaning, a vitality and usefulness.
What we are studying is dynamic emotional syntax; phrases and
narrative sequences of feeling that are certainly foundational for
the structure of verbal sentences, and their messages.”
Endowed with dynamic emotional syntax (DES), human beings,
designed for culture, must be experts in empathy. This conclu-
sion seems less disturbing when I add the constraints: as long
as friendliness and a lack of serious conflict prevails. Conflict,
trouble, quarrel, animosity and finally violence either let empa-
thy disappear or instrumentalize it differently: in order to find out
where the enemy can be struck the most harmful blow. In infancy,
DES is constituted of rhythms of those “motives and emotions for
actions that sustain human intersubjectivity” (Trevarthen, 2011,
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p. 121). Rhythm here means moving one’s body in rhythmic syn-
chrony with the baby’s body. From rhythmic forms of shared
emotionality, the ability to mutually read intentions emerges as
well as the “flow of emerging self-awareness” (Trevarthen, 2011,
p. 121). “To live as an animal, or as an infant . . . is to move with
good purpose; that is, to want to act in ways that will be felt to be
beneficial to the whole individual.” (p. 122).
THE TURN TO ALTEROCENTRISM: CONCORDANT AND
COMPLEMENTARY FORMS OF EMPATHY
What we generalize as “human relatedness” can be understood as
a rich system of various patterns with an I-pole and a You-pole
organized by rhythm, balance and resonance based in evolu-
tionary view on mirror neurons (Ferrari and Gallese, 2007) and
then advancing to conversational and symbolic organization. The
whole system is built bottom-up, but if once established it oper-
ates more and more top-down. There are two dimensions in this
conception: (a) a methodological problem of separating and inte-
grating channels of empathy; (b) a developmental/evolutionary
dimension. What follows are these two points of view.
To do empirical research in “empathy” seems to become a
paradoxical endeavor. Empathy “happens,” it cannot be “applied,”
it cannot be elicited by command and sometimes you have it,
sometimes not. All researchers know this very well. So they cannot
but try to establish an experimental copy of real world empathy.
Battles and Berman (2012) direct their attention to what they call
“conversational acknowledgers” presenting a list of 30 exemplars.
This is very similar to what Heritage described as a spectrum
from response cries to observer response. Such acknowledgers
can be actualized on a verbal and nonverbal level (e.g., “hmhm”
and “nodding”). Four experienced and licensed therapists of an
eclectic orientation produced videos with pseudo clients. The
hypothesis was that an increase of acknowledgers would increase
the perceived empathy of therapists. The videos were produced in
different fashion: some with verbal and nonverbal acknowledgers
in a high degree, some with both low and some videos with a
mixture. The videos were rated by 320 participants. The results
show an unexpected consistency effect for both types of acknowl-
edgers: if the rate of acknowledgers is equal (both low or both
high) than empathy was rated high; if the video observers found
an inconsistency than empathy-ratings decreased.
“Inconsistency in levels of verbal acknowledgers and nodding
leads to miscommunication and perceptions of deception and
sarcasm.” (p. 6)
is the author’s best explanation. So what the 320 video observers
observed was not only the sensory-embodied information:
viewing with eyes frequency of nodding or hearing with ears
the frequency of verbal acknowledgers. What they observed is a
difference, an imbalance (again: balance as an embodied schema)
between the two types of acknowledgers and their empathy
assessment was dependent on this difference. Observers go beyond
sensory information, they immediately conclude from “observ-
ables” to “invisibles”—a “difference” cannot be observed. In
empathy assessment they use sensory information for immediate
integration onto a higher level of meta-information concerning
the integrity of the person emitting the sensory information. This
is the way a top-down strategy begins to operate in the whole
system.
The study group of Regenbogen et al. (2012) highlighted
this topic by a complicated experimental design. They produced
videos, too. They directed their research interest to the ques-
tion which influence single channels of information have when
observers attribute empathy to a story heard and seen in the video.
Three channels were varied: facial expression of a story teller, the
prosody of the voice telling and the content of the narrative told.
The self-related stories, presented by well-trained actors, pre-
sented disgusted, fearful, happy, sad, or neutral narrative content.
Four experimental conditions were varied. The same emotional
expressions on the prosodic or facial expression level were added
so that one could hear a story with neutral content, but with a sad
voice and happy facial expressions. Or in the “neutral condition”
all channels were equal. A complex variation of channel combi-
nation led to the production of 64 short video clips which were
to assessed by 40 healthy persons. They had to rate the emotions
seen on the video and the emotions observed in themselves while
attending to the video. Some other measures such as Galvanic
skin reaction were taken, too. The statistical analysis of this com-
plex design again and again presents “a significant main effect of
Communication” (p. 1002, p. 1003, p. 1004, p. 1005). This phrase
was repeated again and again; it refers to the match of self and
target emotion, to the matching of self and other, to perceived
naturalness, to intensity levels, to a comparison of non-empathic
and neutral responses etc.
Another important result was that once a channel was neu-
tralized, the number of empathic responses decreased. Speech
content was particularly involved for assessing the participants’
own emotion.
“Based on these findings, we attribute a specific role to speech con-
tent, contrary to several findings previously suggested. . . During
the appraisal of several-channel information, neutralized speech
might represent a context in which the bimodal emotional infor-
mation cannot be integrated. In other words, the neutral speech
content did not give a rational explanation of the emotional
visual-auditory perception and subsequently might have inhib-
ited an emotional perspective change, which is a prerequisite for
empathy.” (p. 1009)
And the authors make this point very clear:
“Summarised, the present findings suggest that in human commu-
nication, behavioural empathy relies on consistent information
from several sources; facial expressions, prosody, and speech con-
tent. Omitting one channel generally results in decreased empa-
thy judgements, lower intensities and fewer psychophysiological
reactions. The requirements for empathy are differently affected
by different communication channels. While missing emotional
information in the face decreases a person’s ability to recognise
someone else’s emotional expression displayed by other chan-
nels, omitting emotional information in the speech content causes
the largest drop in performance rates of adequate emotional
reactions.” (p. 1011)
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Cautiously, we can assume this to be experimental evidence for
the influence of the conversational dimension including sensory-
embodied perception which gradually increases in development
and allows for a top-down influence in empathic perception.
Now I want to turn to the developmental dimension. It is inter-
esting to observe that some prominent experimental researchers
also do not hesitate to quote some of those authors philosopher
Stueber quoted. Frans deWaal (2007) contributes a “Russian doll-
model” of empathy in an evolutionary perspective. DeWaal turns
against cognitive conceptions of empathy. Empathy and theory
of mind (ToM) cannot be set equal. Autism in children cannot be
explained by a ToMdeficit because autism can be found before the
age of 4 years. But what are the antecedents of ToM? The answer is
in deWaal’s view that “at the core of the empathic capacity is a rel-
atively simplemechanism that provides an observer (the ‘subject’)
with access to the subjective state of another (the ‘object’) through
the subject’s own neural and bodily representations. When the
subject attends to the object’s state, the subject’s neural represen-
tations of similar states are automatically activated. The closer and
more similar subject and object, the more perceiving the object
will activate matching peripheral motor and autonomic responses
in the subject (e.g., changes in heart rate, skin conductance, facial
expression, body posture). This activation allows the subject to
get ‘under the skin’ of the object, sharing its feelings and needs,
which in turn foster sympathy, compassion, and helping.” (de
Waal, 2007, p. 59).
This automatic embodied response is called the “Perception-
Action Mechanism” (PAM), a description that fits well with other
authors’, such as Damasio’s hypothesis of emotions (2010). What
is important here is not only the close match between contem-
porary authors’ theorizing. Going further, de Waal hints at Lipps
who, long before modern neuropsychological research, pointed
out that what he called Einfühlung meant something like “feeling
into” by which he meant something like inner mimicry. Empathy
is a bodily re-construction of the object’s state of mind, feelings
and other inner states. “Accounts of empathy as a higher cognitive
process neglect such gut-level reactions, which are far too rapid to
be under conscious control,” de Waal (p. 59) adds.
There is a neural basis of empathy as matching the other’s state,
leading to emotional contagion. This process is based on PAM
usingmotormimicry andmatching the actions of others, as in the
case of yawning or imitating other people’s gestures. This provides
the base for higher levels of cooperation and shared intentions
leading to cognitive empathy and understanding the other’s need
for help. At a third level the other is actively imitated and his/her
state is emulated, thus attributing certain emotions and men-
tal states and generating a difference between “my” and “your”
perspective. This difference reiterates the process of individua-
tion while empathy creates bonds. So empathy is a phenomenon
which “covers a wide range of emotional linkage patterns,
from the very simple and automatic to the very sophisticated”
(de Waal, 2007, p. 62).
Here I would like to suggest a differentiation between concor-
dant and complementary empathy.
If a chimpanzee mother sees her baby unable to come down
from a tree, she will reach out her hand to give just that kind
of support and help the baby needs. If a human mother sees her
baby fighting with a woolen blanket that is too warm, she will
remove it with a gesture and talk soothingly to her baby. This is
complementary empathy: both figures involved, the baby and the
mother, have a different stance. One can offer the kind of help or
support the other needs and is willing to grant it. Different qual-
ities and different perspectives complement each other to form
a circle of helping-helped-relationship. Concordant empathy can
be differentiated from that: if you hear a poem that moves your
heart you react in concordance, re-constructing automatically the
same state within yourself as (you think) the poet expressed in the
poem. Here, not difference but equality of emotion is the main
factor.
Both forms of empathy are guided by what Tronick (2007)
termed a “dyadic state of consciousness.” Tronick aims to con-
ceptualize the experience of being included in a “higher” level of
functioning if together with someone else and if both are attuned
at the same wavelength. There is no sender-receiver-relationship,
this is rather included in a part-whole-relationship constituting
new forms of experience, personal identity and emotional quality.
“This dyadic state organization has more components—the infant
and the mother—than the infant’s (or mother’s) own self-
organized state. Thus, this dyadic System contains more informa-
tion and is more complex and coherent than either the infant’s
(or the mother’s) endogenous State of consciousness alone. When
infant and mother mutually create this dyadic state—when they
become components of a dyadic system—both fulfill the first prin-
ciple of systems theory of gaining greater complexity and coher-
ence. The gesturing mother-held-infant performs an action—
gesturing—that is an emergent property of the dyadic System that
would not and could not occur unless the infant and mother were
related to each other as components of a single dyadic system.”
(Tronick, 2007, p. 407)
Tronicks thinks that entry into this kind of dyadic state of con-
sciousness is an indispensable precondition for psychotherapeutic
help. A client must have a feeling that the therapist knows in his
own body what kind of pain the client feels and that the therapist’s
actions are guided by this “feeling into” the client’s emergency—
and this embodied base of empathy must be communicated. The
feeling of being in this state of good care prepares the client to
endure the stress and strains that are bound to come up during
the course of psychotherapy. Empathy can be considered a means
to achieve this indispensable dyadic state of consciousness.
This state is indispensable not only during infancy. An adult
suffering from toothache will endure the necessary surgery much
easier when feeling that the doctor is in resonance with him/her
and will conduct the treatment with care and compassion. A child
at school age who failed in an exam may accept help with study-
ing only when she experiences some form of emotional resonance
from her teacher. Someone with a broken leg from an accident
lying on the ground will accept the risk of painful transportation
only if he can feel that the emergency assistant does what must
be done with a sensibility for what might cause the patient harm
or pain. A psychotic on a psychiatric ward who is in a fit of rage
because of a feeling of being treated with injustice will calm down
when someone tells him convincingly that he is understood in his
claims. Resonance is an indispensable experience.
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CONCLUSION
In the first section I presented conversational data with the inten-
tion to point out some embodied phenomena of empathy. I have
tried to bring together CL and CA by using the theory of embod-
ied schemata Lakoff (1987) proposed. Although these areas are
still somewhat strange to each other as reflected in their position-
ing to “cognition” (Potter, 1998; Deppermann, 2012; Potter and
Edwards, 2013) they seem to converge with respect to embod-
iment. From embodied schemata there is a direct path to cate-
gorization which is object of study in CA and CL. Thus, certain
aspects of embodiment concepts can help to bring theories of
cognition and conversation closer together. To include the body
as an interactional resource of meaning generation is of highest
relevance for studying therapeutic process and for therapeutic lis-
tening as an embodied practice. The way of analysis proposed here
followed this convergence into the domain of therapeutic “talk-
in-interaction.” To include the body does not necessarily involve
video-recording only. The body is present in talk—and this can
be made “hearable” in audio-recording and transcripts following
the convergence of CL and CA as outlined here. Of course, a lot
of empirical research has to be done in the future.
My analysis showed repeating waves of divergence and con-
vergence in a therapeutic dialog, a second and third example
showed the quality of mind reading evolving in one and fail-
ing in the other conversation, the fourth example compared
this with an everyday practice of anticipating the other’s next
move and the fifth example from a psychoanalytic session showed
how the analyst adjusted his interpretative activity following
the patient’s response to a first interpretation. The embodiment
aspects have been outlined in all these examples. In these exam-
ples one can see how sensitive conversation is based in being
aware of the of the other’s body (voice, moves to prevent being
hurt, repair activities), how it operates in talking and how this
sensitivity is done, practiced by analyzable moves, turn taking
units, anticipations. People think, respond and react to think-
ing people and they know that these people are thinking how
they themselves think about what’s going on while things go
on. Empathy should no longer be conceptualized as a special
“tool” gifted persons (therapists) use; empathy should be con-
ceptualized as a coproduction of both embodied participants
using embodied mindful voices. New research questions arise:
what activities are brought into conversation to prepare the coop-
erative coproduction of empathy? How is cooperation in this
special domain prepared and organized? The answers might be
found in the direction of moving waves between convergence and
divergence, of making use of metaphors, of speaking rhythms,
prosody and the like—aspects that can be understood more eas-
ily when abstaining from disembodied concepts of mind and
conversation.
In the second section I tried to organize a theoretical tour
d’horizon along some recent linguistic, philosophical and conver-
sational studies available when one studies empathy. Philosophers
turn to empathy again and they refer to neuroscientific stud-
ies reporting results which in part have been well formulated in
former years by philosophers without having neuroscientific evi-
dence at hand. There is astonishing evidence between these areas
of research and new formulated theories from infant research.
Further research of empathy should include the continuity of
conversation from embodied early childhood proto-conversation
to high levels of abstract communication, the overall cooper-
ative organization of conversation which in early years can be
described bymusicalmetaphors but which are not lost when high
levels of communication are achieved. Balance, rhythm and res-
onance (Buchholz and Gödde, 2013) on high levels play their
embodied role in order to make empathic understanding pos-
sible from embodied proto-conversation stages of development
onwards. Further psychotherapy process research should more
thoroughly consider this musical dimension of embodied conver-
sation. Process research can make use of detailed transcripts in
order to detect these dimensions.
Finally, some remarks about how empathy ruptures might risk
giving birth to conversational forms of violence. Conversational
violence has been shown in a qualitative interview study with 90
participants (Buchholz and von Kleist, 1997) as a consequence
of failed empathy. False empathic understanding has serious
consequences for the “empathizer,” too. If co-embodied empa-
thy operates it creates a sense of being-in-contact fulfilling a
deep human desire. Yet, increasing numbers of ruptures of the
empathic bond are responded with some kind of withdrawal,
aggression or, at least, verbal violence. This is felt in a certain
place: in the therapist’s body.
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